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CONSUMER TRUST AND ONLINE INFORMATION PRIVACY
Yunjie Xu, Bernard C. Y. Tan,
Kai-Lung Hui, and Wai-Kiat Tang
Department of Information Systems





Getting consumers to disclose their personal information is an essential first step for Internet businesses that
choose to pursue a niche marketing strategy.  Previous research has examined how the reward preferences and
privacy concerns of consumers may affect their disclosure tendency.  However, it is not known how key
characteristics pertaining to Internet businesses, such as consumer trust, may affect disclosure tendency.
Based on the results obtained from a survey, this study found that consumer trust in Internet businesses can
facilitate disclosure tendency.  Moreover, consumer trust can suppress the reward preferences and privacy
concerns of consumers, thereby reducing the costs that Internet businesses need to incur in collecting personal
information from consumers.
Keywords:  Information privacy, information disclosure, reward preference, privacy concern, consumer trust
Introduction
An important benefit that electronic commerce promises is the opportunity for mass customization.  With sufficient consumer
information, Internet businesses can cater to the specific needs of consumers in a timely fashion.  Whether such a promise can
be fulfilled or not depends on the ability of Internet businesses to collect personal information from consumers.  Hoffman et al.
(1999) report that “almost 95% of consumers have declined to provide personal information to websites and 63% of these
indicated this is because they do not trust those collecting the data. ” Lack of consumer trust for Internet businesses seems to be
a critical barrier that hinders the efforts of Internet businesses to collect personal information from consumers for the purpose of
mass customization. 
Prior research has suggested that the tendency of consumers to disclose personal information online can be affected by their
privacy concerns and reward preferences.  Privacy concern is a multidimensional construct:  consumers are concerned about the
collection of, unauthorized secondary use of, improper access to, and errors in storing their personal information by Internet
businesses (Culnan 1993; Smith et al. 1996; Stewart and Segars 2002).  Measures such as fair information practices and
confidentiality assurance to consumers may ease privacy concerns and encourage disclosure of personal information (e.g., Culnan
and Armstrong 1999; Milberg et al. 2000).  Providing the right rewards can also induce consumers to disclose personal
information online (Hann et al. 2002; Tam et al. 2002).  The rewards preferred by consumers may be extrinsic (e.g., monetary
savings and time savings) or intrinsic (e.g., pleasure and altruism) in nature (Tam et al. 2002).  In practice, Internet businesses
may simultaneously attempt to alleviate the privacy concerns and meet the reward preferences of consumers so as to induce
consumers to disclose their personal information. 
Measures to meet reward preferences or alleviate privacy concerns of consumers do not come free.  For example, Hann et al.
(2002) estimate that the costs to remove the privacy concerns of all U.S. Internet and e-mail users may range from US $4.56
billion to US $5.70 billion in 2001.  The actual costs incurred by Internet businesses may be contingent upon some key
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characteristics, one of which is consumer trust.  Internet businesses that are considered trustworthy by consumers may incur lower
costs in meeting reward preferences because consumers tend to require less reward for motivating them to provide personal
information to such businesses.  Internet businesses that are considered trustworthy by consumers may also incur lower costs in
alleviating privacy concerns because consumers tend to have less privacy concerns when providing personal information to such
businesses.  In short, consumer trust may moderate the impact of reward preferences or privacy concerns on disclosure tendency.
To date, the role of consumer trust in the context of online information disclosure is not well investigated by researchers. 
Focusing on the issue of consumer trust, this study seeks answers to two research questions:  (1) How does consumer trust affect
consumer tendency to disclose personal information to Internet businesses?  (2) How does consumer trust moderate the impact
of reward preferences or privacy concerns on such disclosure tendency?  From a theoretical perspective, this study adds the
important element of consumer trust to recent efforts to build a theory explaining the disclosure tendency by consumers of Internet
businesses.  From a practical perspective, the results of this study can offer Internet businesses some suggestions on how they
could induce their consumers to disclose personal information under varying conditions of consumer trust. 
Conceptual Background and Hypotheses
The social exchange theory posits that reward and cost factors determine the development of social relationships (Thibaut and
Kelly 1959).  The rewards are positive returns from exhibiting certain behavior within these relationships.  The costs are factors
that inhibit or deter the performance of a sequence of behavior that sustains the relationship.  The relationship between consumers
and Internet businesses can be viewed as a type of such social relationships (Tam et al. 2002).  When Internet businesses meet
the reward preferences of consumers, consumers should exhibit the behavior of disclosing personal information.  However,
privacy concerns represent cost factors that can potentially inhibit consumers from disclosing personal information, thereby
disrupting the relationship.  Based on the social exchange theory, attempts by Internet businesses to meet reward preferences
(supplying reward) and alleviate privacy concerns (reducing cost) should encourage online information disclosure by consumers.
Rewards given to consumers may be extrinsic or intrinsic in nature (Tam et al. 2002).  Extrinsic rewards that have been found
to be useful to induce information disclosure include monetary savings (e.g., give discount coupons in exchange for personal
information), time savings (e.g., provide customized Websites in exchange for personal information), self-concept enhancement
(e.g., allow consumers to become members of exclusive virtual clubs when they provide personal information), and social
adjustment (e.g., give consumers the means to conform to the norms of valued reference groups when they provide personal
information) (Tam et al. 2002).  Intrinsic rewards that have been reported to be useful to induce information disclosure include
pleasure (e.g., provide consumers with an enjoyable experience in exchange for personal information), novelty (e.g., give
consumers opportunities to explore issues that they value when they provide personal information), and altruism (e.g., appeal to
the desire of consumers to help others when getting their personal information) (Tam et al. 2002).  Different consumers have
different reward preferences.  If a consumer has a stronger preference for a certain type of reward, in order to enjoy it when it is
present, the consumer will be more willing to disclose personal information.  Hence, the extent to which providing each type of
reward can induce information disclosure would depend on the preference of a consumer for that particular type of reward.
H1a: Consumers will be more willing to disclose personal information if Internet businesses meet their specific
reward preferences.
Privacy concerns that have been reported to inhibit information disclosure by consumers include inappropriate collection of
personal information (e.g., collect too much consumer information), unauthorized secondary use of personal information (e.g.,
use consumer information for spam or promotion), improper access to personal information (e.g., transfer consumer information
to other business units), and errors in storing personal information (e.g., use outdated consumer information) (Smith et al. 1996;
Stewart and Segars 2002).  Different consumers may have different privacy concerns.  For instance, if a consumer is concerned
about improper access, then she will be more willing to disclose personal information when a Website takes precautionary
measures to ensure that her information is not accessible by unauthorized persons.  Thus, the extent to which alleviating each type
of concern can induce information disclosure would depend on whether a consumer has that particular concern.
H1b: Consumers will be more willing to disclose personal information if Internet businesses alleviate their specific
privacy concerns.
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Besides reward preferences and privacy concerns, consumers are also affected by their trust for Internet businesses when deciding
whether or not to disclose personal information (Culnan and Bies 2003).  Consumer trust induces disclosure tendency because
it lowers the risk perception of consumers.  An objective evaluation of risk (e.g., probability of information misuse) is typically
infeasible because the consumer may not have adequate information about, or prior experience with, the Internet businesses that
solicit their personal information.  Yet, before they know enough about these Internet businesses, consumers often have to decide
whether or not to give personal information to these Internet businesses for carrying out transactions (e.g., purchase products or
services, and sign up as members of virtual clubs).  This “willingness to be vulnerable” in taking a risky action, on the part of
consumers, reflects consumer trust (Mayer et al. 1995).  Sometimes, such consumer trust is formed based on limited information
about, or prior experience with, the Internet business.  By lowering their risk perception (Javenpaa et al. 2000; Mayer et al. 1995;
McKnight et al. 2002), such consumer trust causes a “leap in faith” which results in risk-taking behavior by consumers (Lewis
and Weigert 1985).
An extensive body of research has reported that trust is a direct cause of cooperative behavior (Dirks and Ferrin 2001).  In the
context of Internet businesses, consumer trust alone may induce consumers to disclose their personal information, irrespective
of whether there are efforts to meet reward preferences or alleviate privacy concerns.  Trustworthiness, in the form of competence,
benevolence, and integrity of businesses, has been reported to bring about online information disclosure (Mayer et al. 1995).
Consumers may be more willing to disclose personal information to Internet businesses that are perceived to be competent in
providing basic services, helpful in handling consumer requests, and honest in handling transactions.  Therefore, consumer trust
is likely to have a direct impact on disclosure tendency.
H2: Consumers will be more willing to disclose personal information if Internet businesses have their trust.
Besides directly affecting disclosure tendency, consumer trust may also moderate the impact of reward preferences and privacy
concerns on disclosure tendency.  In business transactions, people tend to observe risk-return tradeoffs, and demand less rewards
if the probability of getting the rewards is higher (Tversky et al. 1988).  Following this line of argument, consumers may demand
less rewards from trusted Internet businesses in exchange for their personal information because the probability of getting the
rewards from trusted Internet businesses should be higher.  Hence, rewards preferences can be suppressed in the presence of
consumer trust.  That is, the more a consumer trusts a company, the less the consumer cares about rewards.  If the company is
not trusted by the consumer, then it may need to give more rewards to induce the consumer to disclose personal information.
H3a: The relationship between meeting specific reward preferences and the disclosure of personal information will
be stronger under conditions of low consumer trust than high consumer trust.
Schur and Ozanne (1985) observe that, in a trustor-trustee relationship, the trustor tends to have less desire to bargain and is
usually more willing to accommodate the trustee if the trustee is reliable.  By the same token, consumer trust can alter the signi-
ficance of privacy concerns to consumers.  Consumers may be more willing to accommodate the requests of Internet businesses
that solicit personal information if these businesses are considered trustworthy.  Consumers may have less of a desire to demand
privacy protection mechanisms, given the presence of consumer trust.  Hence, privacy concerns can be suppressed in the presence
of consumer trust.  In other words, the more the consumer trusts the business, the less the consumer cares about the privacy
protection mechanisms.  On the contrary, for a less-trusted company, a consumer may expect strong privacy protection.
H3b: The relationship between alleviating specific privacy concerns and disclosure of personal information will be
stronger under conditions of low consumer trust than high consumer trust.
Methodology
The survey research method was used for data collection.  Scales were developed to measure the seven types of reward
preferences, the four types of privacy concerns, consumer trust, and disclosure tendency.  These scales were then consolidated
into a questionnaire and administered to subjects. 
Scale Development
Questions to measure the seven types of reward preferences were adapted from an instrument presented in Tam et al. (2002).  This
instrument had a total of 26 questions to assess the preferences for monetary savings, time savings, self-concept enhancement,
social adjustment, pleasure, novelty, and altruism.  All questions were anchored on seven-point Likert scales. 
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Questions to measure the four types of privacy concerns were adapted from an instrument developed and validated by Smith et
al. (1996).  This instrument had a total of 15 questions to assess the four dimensions of privacy concerns:  excessive collection
of, unauthorized secondary use of, improper access to, and errors in storing personal information.  To assess the effects of
alleviating privacy concerns, these questions were reworded as questions measuring consumer preference for privacy protections.
For example, regarding the error in stored information, an original question asking about consumer concern on storing erroneous
information was reworded as a question asking about consumer preference for procedures to correct erroneous information.  Such
revision is grounded on Fair Information Practices, which require data collectors to offer mechanisms to maintain the accuracy
of the collected information.  The reworded questions were also similar in nature to those measuring reward preferences.  All
questions were anchored on seven-point Likert scales.
Eight questions to measure consumer trust were modified from an instrument presented in Doney and Cannon (1997).  All ques-
tions were anchored on seven-point Likert scales.  To increase the generalizability of the result, three different scenarios of online
information solicitation were created.  In the three scenarios, the three Internet businesses soliciting consumer information were
Nokia Club (see www.club.nokia.com.sg), Iguana Mobile (see www.apic.com.sg), and MiReDo Tones (a fictitious company).
These companies represent different scales of operations in the same industry.
To assess disclosure tendency (the dependent variable), self-generated questions were used to measure consumer intention to
provide personal information to Internet businesses.  A baseline question assessed disclosure intention in the absence of any effort
to meet reward preferences or alleviate privacy concerns.  Seven other questions assessed disclosure intention in the presence of
each of the seven types of rewards (which corresponded to efforts to meet the seven reward preferences).  Four other questions
assessed disclosure intention in the presence of each of the four types of privacy protections (which corresponded to efforts to
alleviate each of the four types of privacy concerns).  All questions were anchored on seven-point Likert scales.  The difference
in disclosure intention between each of the seven questions (with rewards) and the baseline question reflected the impact of
providing each type of reward.  The difference in disclosure intention between each of the four questions (with privacy protec-
tions) and the baseline question reflected the impact of alleviating each type of privacy concern.  Using such differences in
disclosure intention as the dependent variable also had the advantage of cancelling out spurious (e.g., individual-specific) factors
affecting disclosure tendency. 
Data Collection
The survey was administered to 360 senior undergraduate students enrolled in an electronic commerce course.  A major
assignment in this course was to develop a functional retail Website.  Thus, all the subjects who participated in this study should
have been familiar with both technical and managerial issues pertaining to Internet businesses.  Given that consumers of Internet
businesses are generally younger and highly educated, this sample of subjects should be reasonably representative of such
consumers.  Table 1 gives the general statistics of the subjects. 
The purpose of the research was not disclosed to the subjects before the survey.  The three scenarios (Nokia Club, Iguana Mobile,
and MiReDo Tones) were randomly assigned to the subjects.  Although all of the subjects voluntarily participated in this study,
those who completed the survey were given a token payment.  Altogether, 331 usable responses were collected, with 112
responses for Nokia Club, 110 responses for Iguana Mobile, and 109 responses for MiReDo Tones.





Internet usage (hours/week) 34.7 27.8
Online disclosure experience (number of Websites
in the last 12 months)
7 9.5
Online purchase experience (percent) 41.2% n/a
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Analyses and Results
All statistical tests were carried out at a 5 percent level of significance. 
Measurement Model
The measurement properties of all the questions that measured reward preferences, privacy concerns, and consumer trust were
assessed.  Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, and average variance extracted were computed for each construct to check for
reliability (see Table 2).  A construct had adequate reliability if the Cronbach’s alpha was at least 0.7, composite reliability was
at least 0.7, and average variance extracted was at least 0.5 (Bagozzi and Yi 1988; Nunnally 1978).  Separate confirmatory factor
analyses (using LISREL 8.51) were conducted to examine the convergent and discriminant validity of each set of questions (see
Table 2).  For brevity, standardized factor loadings for all questions (on their intended constructs) were not reported.
All seven constructs reflecting reward preferences had adequate reliability (see Table 2).  The goodness-of-fit index (GFI) for the
measurement model (7 constructs, 26 questions) was 0.86, a marginally acceptable level (Hu and Bentler 1995).  Both the root
mean square residuals (RMR) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) for this measurement model were 0.067,
which was within the acceptable range (Hair et al. 1995) (see Table 3).  Standardized factor loadings for all (but one) questions
were greater than the recommended threshold of 0.50 (Hair et al. 1995).  One question for social adjustment had a factor loading
of 0.46, which was close to the recommended threshold.  The t-statistics of all factor loadings were substantial and significant
(p < 0.01).  Overall, this measurement model was adequate. 
All four constructs reflecting privacy concerns also had adequate reliability (see Table 2).  The goodness-of-fit index (GFI) for
the measurement model (4 constructs, 15 questions) was 0.92, an acceptable level.  The root mean square residuals (RMR) and
the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) for this measurement model were also within the acceptable range (see
Table 3).  Standardized factor loadings for all questions were greater than the recommended threshold of 0.50.  The t-statistics
of all factor loadings were substantial and significant (p < 0.01).  Overall, this measurement model was also adequate. 
The consumer trust construct had adequate reliability (see Table 2).  For this construct, two questions were dropped due to low
standardized factor loadings (both below 0.40), leaving only six questions that measured the construct.  After dropping the two
questions, the goodness-of-fit index (GFI), root mean square residuals (RMR), and root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA) were within the acceptable range (see Table 3). 









Monetary savings (MS) 0.91 0.91 0.72
Time savings (TS) 0.81 0.80 0.60
Self-concept enhancement (SC) 0.84 0.84 0.64
Social adjustment (SA) 0.75 0.73 0.50
Pleasure (PL) 0.86 0.85 0.67
Novelty (NV) 0.85 0.85 0.54
Altruism (AL) 0.91 0.91 0.66
Inappropriate collection (IC) 0.81 0.81 0.52
Unauthorized secondary use (US) 0.87 0.87 0.64
Improper access (IA) 0.85 0.85 0.65
Errors in storing (ES) 0.82 0.81 0.53
Consumer trust (CT) 0.87 0.86 0.54
Xu et al./Consumer Trust and Online Information Privacy
2003 — Twenty-Fourth International Conference on Information Systems 543











Chi-square (df) 690.42 (278) 228.53 (84) 50.96 (9)
GFI 0.86 0.92 0.95
AGFI 0.83 0.88 0.89
RMR 0.067 0.043 0.041
RMSEA 0.067 0.072 0.120
Hypotheses Testing
After ensuring that the measurement properties of all questions had adequate reliability and validity, the measure for each
construct was computed by averaging all of its questions.  During hypotheses testing, a separate multiple regression analysis was
carried out for each reward preference and each privacy concern.  Therefore, the hypotheses were tested using a set of 11
regression analyses (corresponding to the seven reward preferences and the four privacy concerns). 
For each multiple regression equation, there were two independent variables, one for the level of reward preference or privacy
concern (to test H1a and H1b) and the other for the level of consumer trust (to test H2), as well as an interaction term involving
these two independent variables (to test H3a and H3b).  The dependent variable was measured by the question that asked subjects
for their disclosure intention (DI) when a specific reward preference was met, or when a specific privacy concern was alleviated.
For example, the regression equation for monetary savings would be DI(MS) = MS + CT + MS × CT. 
The results of these multiple regression analyses revealed that there were significant collinearity problems.  The variance inflation
factors and condition indices greatly exceeded the acceptable values of 10 and 30 (Hair et al. 1995) respectively in all of the
analyses.  The collinearity problem led to estimation inefficiency and made it difficult to interpret the regression coefficients or
draw meaningful conclusions.  To overcome this problem, the hypothesis testing was carried out in two stages instead. 
In the first stage, 11 multiple regression analyses were used to test H1a, H1b, and H2.  As before, there were two independent
variables, one for the level of reward preference or privacy concern (to test H1a and H1b) and the other for the level of consumer
trust (to test H2).  The interaction term was dropped because H3a and H3b were not being tested at this stage.  The same
dependent variable was used.  Hence, the regression equation for monetary savings would be DI(MS) = MS + CT. 
Table 4 shows the results of the 11 multiple regression analyses.  The variance inflation factors (VIF) and condition indices (CI)
were acceptable, indicating no collinearity problem.  All the regression coefficients were positive and significant (see Table 4).
H1a, H1b, and H2 were supported.  If consumers had a specific reward preference, meeting that reward preference (by providing
the corresponding reward) increased their tendency to disclose personal information.  If consumers had a specific privacy concern,
alleviating that privacy concern (by implementing the corresponding protection) increased their tendency to disclose personal
information.  Moreover, the presence of consumer trust also increased the tendency of consumers to disclose personal information
to Internet businesses.
In the second stage, another 11 multiple regression analyses were performed to assess H3a and H3b.  In these regressions, an
independent variable for the level of reward preference or privacy concern and an interaction term involving the independent
variable and consumer trust were used.  The dependent variable was constructed by subtracting the baseline disclosure intention
(BL; i.e., no reward preferences were met and no privacy concerns were alleviated) from the disclosure intention (DI) by the same
subject when a specific reward preference was met or a specific privacy concern was alleviated.  This subtraction helped eliminate
individual-specific characteristics, including consumer trust, which might affect disclosure intention.  Therefore, consumer trust
need not be included as an independent variable in these analyses.  This could help resolve the collinearity problem between
consumer trust and the interaction term.  In short, the regression equation for monetary savings would be DI(MS) – B = MS +
MS × T.
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Table 4.  Results of First Stage Analyses
Multiple Regression Equation Predictors Coefficient
Std.
Error p R2 VIF CI



































































































Table 5 presents the results of the 11 multiple regression analyses.  The variance inflation factors (VIF) and condition indices (CI)
showed that there was no collinearity problem.  All the regression coefficients for the independent variable (except for altruism)
were positive and significant (see Table 5).  These results reinforced the support for H1a and H1b presented earlier in Table 4.
All coefficients of the interaction term were negative (see Table 5), supporting H3a and H3b.  However, four of these coefficients
(for monetary savings, social adjustment, pleasure, and inappropriate collection) were not significant.  Therefore, the moderating
impact of consumer trust appeared to be modest.  Nevertheless, consumer trust seemed to suppress the relationship between
reward preferences and disclosure intention (if the reward preferences were met), and the relationship between privacy concerns
and disclosure intention (if the privacy concerns were alleviated).  With consumer trust, Internet businesses could put in less effort
to meet reward preferences or alleviate privacy concerns and still obtain personal information from their consumers. 
Discussion 
The results of this study show that Internet businesses can obtain personal information from their consumers by trying to meet
the reward preferences of these consumers.  Providing such valued rewards to consumers is consistent with the benefit congruency
principle of marketing (Chandon et al. 2000), and the compatibility principle of psychology (Tversky et al. 1988).  Seven types
of rewards that may be employed to enhance the effectiveness of online marketing are monetary savings, time savings, self-
concept enhancement, social adjustment, pleasure, novelty, and altruism (Tam et al. 2002).  These results also show that Internet
businesses can obtain personal information from their consumers by trying to alleviate the privacy concerns of these consumers.
Four types of protections that may be put in place are protections against inappropriate collection of, unauthorized secondary use
of, improper access to, and errors in storing personal information (Smith et al. 1996).
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Table 5.   Results of Second Stage Analyses
Multiple Regression Equation Predictors Coefficient
Std.
Error p R2 VIF CI



































































































Consumer trust seems to affect disclosure tendency in two ways.  First, consistent with prior studies (e.g., McKnight et al. 2002),
consumer trust for Internet businesses seems to directly increase the willingness of consumers to provide personal information
to these businesses, irrespective of whether efforts have been made to meet reward preferences or alleviate privacy concerns.
Second, consumer trust seems to suppress reward preferences and privacy concerns of consumers, thereby reducing the need for
Internet businesses to meet reward preferences or alleviate privacy concerns when attempting to solicit personal information from
consumers.  This may greatly reduce the costs or efforts to collect such information, which is needed for focused marketing
efforts.  Efforts by Internet businesses to build consumer trust are worthwhile because consumer trust is an organizational asset.
These results must be interpreted in the context of the limitations of this study.  One clear limitation is the use of student subjects.
Although these subjects are familiar with both technical and managerial issues pertaining to Internet businesses, they may have
little prior experience carrying out transactions with (and providing personal information to) actual Internet businesses.  Compared
to actual consumers, the student subjects may have weaker reward preferences, privacy concerns, or consumer trust.  This study
needs to be replicated with a sample of actual consumers of Internet businesses.  Another limitation is the collinearity problems
encountered during hypotheses testing.  Instead of testing all of  the hypotheses together, a two-stage approach had to be used.
More research work is needed to understand the collinearity problems between consumer trust and the interaction term.  This study
needs to be replicated across a variety of settings to assess the robustness of the results.  However, in spite of these limitations,
the results of this study offer important theoretical and practical implications. 
Theoretical Implications
This study builds on the findings of prior research in several ways.  First, it establishes the usefulness of the seven reward
preferences (Tam et al. 2002) in motivating consumers to provide their personal information to Internet businesses.  Second,
earlier studies have identified four privacy concerns (Smith et al. 1996; Stewart and Segars 2002) that can inhibit information
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disclosure.  This study verifies the usefulness of privacy protections, for these four privacy concerns, in motivating consumers
to provide their personal information to Internet businesses. 
Third, this study introduces the factor of consumer trust into research about online information privacy.  By directly impacting
disclosure tendency, consumer trust may be considered a substitute for meeting reward preferences or alleviating privacy concerns
when eliciting personal information.  By suppressing consumer desire for rewards or privacy protections, consumer trust may be
seen as a trade-off for meeting reward preferences or alleviating privacy concerns when eliciting personal information.  More
research work is clearly needed before the factor of consumer trust can be integrated into any theory in the area of online
information privacy.  Nevertheless, this study opens up a broader research issue.  Considering that reward preferences and privacy
concerns are personal factors and that consumer trust is an organizational factor (some Internet businesses are more trusted by
a general body of consumers than others), the results of this study raise interesting research questions about how various personal
factors may substitute or trade off with various organizational factors (e.g., brand reputation) in affecting disclosure tendency by
consumers.  Also, the trade-offs among personal factors (e.g., meeting a specific reward preference but not alleviating a specific
privacy concern) can be examined for the impact on disclosure tendency under varying levels of consumer trust. 
Practical Implications
Internet businesses can obtain personal information about their consumers by meeting their reward preferences.  Some organi-
zations have offered such rewards when their consumers provide personal information online (Tam et al. 2002).  Examples of
businesses that have offered monetary savings or time savings include AT&T, Sprint, and Dell.  Businesses that have offered self-
concept enhancement or social adjustment include Macromedia and ZD Net.  Businesses that have provided rewards to consumers
in the form of pleasure and novelty include CD Now and Disney.  Businesses that have appealed to the altruism of consumers
include Salvation Army and United Nations Children’s Fund.  To understand the reward preferences of their consumers, Internet
businesses may administer the instrument used in this study to their customers. 
Internet businesses can also elicit personal information of their consumers by alleviating their privacy concerns.  Smith (1994)
describes how seven organizations in four different industries have responded to privacy concerns of their consumers by putting
together some privacy protection mechanisms to alleviate these concerns.  Such mechanisms may help to raise the willingness
of consumers to disclose their personal information (Culnan 1993).  Again, to understand the privacy concerns (and desired
privacy protections) of their consumers, Internet businesses may administer the instrument used in this study to their customers.
As Internet businesses attempt to meet reward preferences or alleviate privacy concerns (or do both) to elicit personal information
from consumers, they must be cognizant of the role that consumer trust plays in this process.  Different measures can be used for
existing consumers and new consumers.  When dealing with existing consumers (where consumer trust is likely to be high),
consumer trust can be used to elicit personal information.  Internet businesses may want to emphasize their past competence (e.g.,
how they have provided good basic services), benevolence (e.g., how they have been helpful in handling consumer requests), and
integrity (e.g., how they have been honest in handling transactions) (Mayer et al. 1995).  They can explain how acquiring
additional personal information from consumers can help them do even better in terms of competence, benevolence, and integrity.
This may motivate some existing consumers to disclose their personal information.  In this case, it may be less costly for Internet
businesses to rely on consumer trust (compared to meeting reward preferences or alleviating privacy concerns) to collect personal
information.
When dealing with new consumers (where consumer trust is likely to be low), Internet businesses are likely to have to rely on
meeting reward preferences or alleviating privacy concerns to collect personal information from consumers.  Depending on the
nature of their businesses, some types of rewards may be more salient (Tam et al. 2002) and some types of privacy protection
mechanisms may be more feasible (Smith 1994).  Internet businesses need to study new consumers carefully to understand their
reward preferences and privacy concerns.  Given that consumer trust is an organizational asset, Internet businesses should also
undertake efforts to build consumer trust (McKnight et al. 2002).  These efforts should focus on establishing perceived
competence (e.g., provide good basic services), benevolence (e.g., be helpful in handling consumer requests), and integrity (e.g.,
be honest in handling transactions) (Mayer et al. 1995).  Over time, the consumer trust that develops from such efforts should
make it easier for these Internet businesses to elicit even more personal information from their consumers. 
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Conclusion
This study builds on the existing literature by simultaneously investigating the impact of reward preferences and privacy concerns
on disclosure tendency under varying levels of consumer trust.  It contributes to the literature on online information privacy in
several ways.  First, it shows that meeting reward preferences (by providing suitable rewards) and alleviating privacy concerns
(by providing suitable privacy protections) can achieve similar effects of encouraging disclosure of personal information.  Second,
it clarifies the role of consumer trust in this process.  Consumer trust can facilitate disclosure of personal information directly or
through suppressing the reward preferences and privacy concerns of consumers.  In summary, besides offering some foundational
elements (personal and organizational factors) that should contribute toward a theory on online information privacy, the findings
of this study provide precise guidance (in the form of seven reward preferences and four privacy concerns) to Internet businesses
on how they can effectively elicit personal information from their consumers. 
In the future, an increasing number of Internet businesses may adopt focused marketing efforts and exploit opportunities for mass
customization because this is a good survival strategy.  For such efforts to be effective, these Internet businesses would need to
collect plenty of personal information from consumers.  Future research efforts, in the direction taken by this study, can add to
our understanding about how to effectively obtain such personal information from consumers. 
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